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APPLYING PUBLIC TRUST TESTS TO 
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO CLOSE NATIONAL 
PARK AREAS 
Peter Egan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Should Congress charge a commission with the task of recommend-
ing which National Park System Units, including the Statue of Lib-
erty, the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, and the Fire Island 
National Seashore, warrant decommission or modification? House Bill 
260, the National Park Service Reform Act, envisioned such a com-
mittee, but was rejected by the House in 1995. This Comment sug-
gests that the Massachusetts Public Trust Doctrine provides a supe-
rior procedure for modifying and/or decommissioning park areas. 
After a brief introduction to the public trust doctrine in Section I, 
Section II of this Comment details the development of the doctrine in 
the United States. Section III examines the Massachusetts and Wis-
consin applications of the public trust, respectively. Section IV ex-
plores the public trust's pertinence to the Federal Government and 
Section V focuses on National Park System Units. After reviewing 
House Bill 260 in Section VI, the Comment concludes with an analysis 
of which method, that of Massachusetts, Wisconsin, or Congress, is 
best suited to modifying and/or decommissioning National Park Sys-
tem Units. 
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine is based on the belief that various common 
properties, including rivers, the seashore, and the air, are held by the 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
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government in trusteeship for the public's unimpeded use. l According 
to Professor Sax, the idea of a public trusteeship is grounded upon 
three principles. First, because certain resources, such as the air and 
sea, are important to the citizenry as a whole, private ownership of 
such resources is unwise.2 Second, because some resources, "partake 
so much of the bounty of nature, rather than of individual enterprise," 
they should be available to all citizens regardless of economic means.3 
And third, the government should advance the general public interest 
instead of redistributing public resources for private gain.4 
"By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the 
air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea."5 
According to this ancient principle, perpetual use of common proper-
ties "was dedicated to the public,"6 and incapable of private owner-
ship.7 English common law modified this Roman version of the public 
trust by adopting the legal fiction that the Sovereign could and did 
own these common resources.8 Consequently, the public trust has 
been affiliated with the Sovereign's control of the beds of waterways, 
primarily for the purpose of advancing navigation, commerce, and 
fisheries.9 
Ownership by the Crown, however, was limited.lo The Sovereign 
could not transfer public trust properties to a private party if the 
grant would interfere with the public interest.ll Lord Bracton ex-
plained, "It is another rule of law, that public rights, and such things 
as are materially related to them, are inalienable."12 As a result, "all 
things which relate peculiarly to the public good cannot be given over 
or transferred ... to another person, or separated from the crown."13 
1 See JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 
163-M (1970). 
2 See id. at 165. 
3 [d. 
4 See id. 
6Jan S. Stevens, The Public 'Prust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's 
Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195,196-97 (1980) (quoting the INSTITUTES OF 
JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (T. Cooper trans. & ed., 1841». 
6 SAX, supra note 1, at 164. 
7 See Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging 
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 397-98 (1991). 
8 See Rieser, supra note 7 at 398; Stevens, supra note 5, at 197-98 n.4. 
9 See Stevens, supra note 5, at 195-96. 
10 See Rieser, supra note 7, at 398. 
11 See id. 
12 Stevens, supra note 5, at 198 (quoting H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF 
ENGLAND 39-40 (S. Thorne trans., 1968». 
13 [d. 
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Consequently, the public interests of navigation, fishing, and com-
merce were protected from private ownership of waters influenced 
by the tide.14 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 
In 1821, the New Jersey Supreme Court enunciated a modern 
version of the public trust doctrine in the United States.15 According 
to that court, the Crown held rights in the beds of navigable waters 
in trust, for the common use of the people.16 The states succeeded to 
this trust, and a grant divesting the public of these common rights 
was void,17 This conclusion was adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court twenty-one years later in the case of Martin v. Wad-
dell. 18 According to Chief Justice Taney, "When the Revolution took 
place, the people of each State became themselves sovereign; and in 
that character held the absolute right to all their navigable waters, 
and the soils under them, for common use, subject only to the rights 
since surrendered by the constitution to the general government."19 
Consequently, the Martin case supports the idea that common prop-
erties are held by the government in trusteeship for the free and 
unimpeded use of the general public.20 
After acquisition of the Northwest Territory and the Louisiana 
Purchase, state courts expanded the public trust doctrine to include 
navigable waterways not influenced by the tide.21 Unrestricted use of 
inland waterways was necessary for the development of the country.22 
The public trust in the United States also expanded as concepts of the 
public right evolved to encompass diverse uses in addition to naviga-
tion and commerce.23 In 1853, the Michigan Supreme Court held that 
the servitude of the public interest depends upon the purpose for 
which the public requires the use of its streams rather than upon any 
particular mode of use.24 
14 See City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 437 (Cal. 1960). 
15 See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 10 (N.J. 1821); Stevens, supra note 5, at 199. 
16 See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 10. 
17 See Stevens, supra note 5, at 199. 
18 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See Stevens, supra note 5, at 196. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 See Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519, 525 (1853). 
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The public trust doctrine gradually has expanded to embrace a 
broad array of areas and activities.25 For instance, in Lamprey v. 
State, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that the lakes of that 
state are used by the people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, 
bathing, skating, and other public purposes.26 Consequently, the trust 
was expanded to include these inland bodies of water, although they 
were not navigable, and therefore not subject to a narrow interpre-
tation of the public trust.27 The court determined that allowing the 
transfer of lakes to private ownership, under an old or narrow test of 
navigability, "would be a great wrong upon the public for all time."28 
Similarly, California decisions have expanded the public trust doc-
trine to protect the general public's interests in recreation and heri-
tage preservation.29 Consequently, the scope of the public trust doc-
trine again has been extended beyond its traditional and narrow limits 
of navigable waterways. Marks v. Whitney expressly recognizes rec-
reation as an activity protected by the trust.30 In addition, National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court identifies a state duty to protect 
the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and tide-
lands.3! That court stated, "One of the most important public uses of 
the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is pres-
ervation of these lands in their natural state."32 According to the 
court, by maintaining the tidelands in their natural state, "they may 
serve as ecological units for scientific study, for open space, and as 
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine 
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area."33 
III. COMPETING ApPROACHES To THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Massachusetts and Wisconsin have developed philosophically op-
posing approaches for grappling with public trust questions.34 While 
25 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Moore, 2 Mich. at 525; Lamprey v. State, 
52 Minn. 181, 199-200, (1893); Stevens, supra note 5, at 222. 
26 See Lamprey, 52 Minn. at 199-200. 
27 See id. at 200. 
28 [d. at 221. 
29 See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380; National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 
(Cal. 1983). 
30 Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
31 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 724. 
32 [d. at 719. 
33 [d. 
34 Compare Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969) and Gould v. 
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Massachusetts has instituted procedural protections for public trust 
lands, Wisconsin courts guard against the waste of trust property by 
espousing a more substantive test.35 The doctrines of both states shed 
light upon questions pertaining to public trust policy.36 Congress at-
tempted to restructure the National Parks System, which contains 
several similarities to public trust lands, in House Bill 260.37 The 
remainder of this Comment will examine and compare the benefits 
and weaknesses of the Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and congressional 
methodologies. 
A. The Massachusetts Approach Toward the Public Trust Doctrine 
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has adopted 
an approach that is designed to hold elected officials accountable for 
policies affecting public trust land, which includes lands dedicated to 
the public interest.38 Skeptical of agency decisions made by unelected 
officials influenced by private interest groups, the Massachusetts 
courts mandate that explicit legislation direct the transfer of public 
interest land from one use to another.39 The legislation must acknow-
ledge the interest being surrendered as well as recognize the new use 
for the property.40 The seminal case pertaining to the public trust 
doctrine in Massachusetts is Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commis-
sionY Mount Greylock (3,491 feet) is the highest peak of an isolated 
range surrounded by lowlands.42 In 1898, Massachusetts created the 
Greylock Reservation Commission (Commission) to purchase the 
Greylock State Reservation.43 Then, in 1960, the Commission leased 
almost half of the reservation to a second state entity, the Mount 
Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) with City of Milwaukee v. State, 
214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927) and Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 
(Wis. 1896) and State v. Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
35 Compare Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 579, and Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 114, with Milwaukee, 214 
N.W. at 830, and Priewe, 67 N.W. at 921-22, and Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 632. 
36 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 579; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126; Milwaukee, 214 N.W. at 830; 
Priewe, 67 N.W. at 921-22; Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 632. 
37 See H.R. 260, l04th Congo (1995). 
38 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126; Joseph Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 
495-96, 502 (1970). 
39 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126; Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate,424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Mass. 1981); Sax, supra note 38, at 495-96. 
40 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d at 1100. 
41 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 114. 
42 See id. at 116. 
43 Seeid. 
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Greylock Tramway Authority (Authority), that was empowered to 
construct and operate a tramway on Mount Greylock.44 The Authority 
subsequently entered into a management agreement with a joint 
venture corporation, American Resort Services, Inc. (Resort), to de-
velop Mount Greylock as a ski resort.45 
The facts surrounding Gould led the court to view the Authority's 
actions as they pertained to the public trust skeptically.46 For instance, 
as a consequence of the project's management agreement, Resort 
could receive forty percent of the development's profits.47 Moreover, 
while the Authority was empowered statutorily to construct and 
operate a tramwaY,48 the proposed ski area appeared to dwarf any 
development intended by the State legislature.49 The resort would 
have included four chairlifts, totaling 14,825 feet, and eleven ski trails 
of a total length of 56,600 feet. 50 The Gould court was concerned that 
public lands would be diverted to Resort for promotion of its private 
interests.51 
The Resort proposal was challenged by five citizens seeking a writ 
of mandamus and declaratory relief against the Commission and the 
Authority.52 Subsequently, the SJC held that the Commission's 1960 
lease to the Authority was void.53 The Court determined that the lease 
was not reasonably related to the Authority's statutory mandate.54 
The SJC then determined that the Authority acted beyond its dele-
gated powers by entering into the management agreement for a ski 
resort.55 According to the Court, "if a project of this magnitude in a 
State forest reservation had been intended, it would have been natu-
ral and appropriate for the enabling legislation to have stated that 
purpose much more definitely and described its scope more spe-
cifically than had in fact been done."56 
44 See id. at 118. 
45 See id. at 120. 
46 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 119. 
47 See id. at 126. 
48 See id. at 118. 
49 See id. at 122. 
50 See id. 
51 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 125. 
52 See id. at 123. 
53 See id. at 124. 
54 See id. at 123, 124. 
55 See id. at 124. 
56 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 123. 
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Clearly, the Massachusetts legislature did not intend to preserve 
Mount Greylock permanently in its natural state.57 Moreover, the 
governmental agencies overseeing the reservation were granted lim-
ited powers to contract between themselves and private parties.58 
Regardless, the SJC deemed the Commission's 1960 lease to the 
Authority and the Authority's management agreement void because 
they were beyond the scope of the agencies' statutory authority. 59 
Rather than striking down a legislative initiative because it altered a 
public trust land, the SJC created an ingenious legal rule.60 Essen-
tially, the public interest may be diminished in two ways.61 First, the 
land in question may be delivered to a private interest, as was the 
case in Gould.62 Second, public land may be degraded or reduced 
physically.63 However, the Court presumes that the state does not 
desire a reduction of the public interest.64 This presumption will be 
removed by explicit legislation proclaiming the pubic interest to be 
served by a specific alteration to trust land.65 The principle benefit of 
the Massachusetts approach is that the court is not placed in the 
unenviable position of nullifying legislation and insisting that the 
legislature has failed to act in the public interest.66 Indeed, the court's 
presumption is that the legislature is acting to preserve public lands 
for broad public use.67 
Consequently, the Massachusetts courts oversee the granting of 
public trust lands while simultaneously providing for their modifica-
tion as public interests develop and change.68 Moreover, the power to 
enact such alterations rests with the legislature, a branch of govern-
ment presumably responsive to public demands. 
The Massachusetts Public Trust doctrine addresses another nag-
ging problem confronting the transfer of public trust land.69 How can 
57 See id. at 118; Sax, supra note 38, at 493. 
58 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 123, 125. 
59 See Sax, supra note 38, at 493. 
60 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126; Sax, supra note 38, at 493. 
61 See generally Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969); Gould, 
215 N.E.2d at 114. 
62 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 120. 
63 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 578. 
64 See Sax, supra note 38, at 494. 
65 See id. at 495. 
66 See id. at 494-95. 
67 See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 121; Sax, supra note 38, at 494. 
68 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126; Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Mass. 1981) 
69 See Sax, supra note 38, at 496. 
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courts ensure that the general public's interest in trust land is 
weighed adequately against more particularly interested parties? 
When government agencies consider the allocation of public lands for 
private interests, public officials often will be subjected to intense 
lobbying on behalf of the proposed project.70 Conversely, advocation 
against such projects could be minimal because public sentiment is 
not alerted to preliminary agency actions.71 By calling for express 
legislative approval of policies affecting public lands, the Massachu-
setts courts are providing a more level playing field for competing 
public and private interests.72 Furthermore, through visible and open 
consideration of public land issues in the legislature, the public is able 
to hold decisionmakers accountable.73 In the case of lower visibility 
agency decisions, there is no similar accountability because the 
agency head is most likely an appointed, rather than an elected, of-
ficial.74 The Massachusetts courts thereby are promoting a climate 
appropriate for determining policies which will affect lands held in 
common by all citizens.75 
The Massachusetts courts have developed a similar legal rule ad-
dressing alterations of public trust land which cater to public, rather 
than private, interests.76 Professor Sax, for example, asks how con-
servationists' views can be represented adequately when a highway 
department proposes to build a road through parkland endowed to 
the public trust?77 The park agency may, with little public visibility, 
grant the necessary property to the highway department.78 Given 
such a scenario, many courts would hold that protection of the public 
interest is vested in the public agencies, which should not be second-
guessed by the courtS.79 
Massachusetts courts, however, force agencies to obtain specific, 
overt approval before altering public trust lands.80 Consequently, 
agency proposals affecting public lands must be voted on by the 
70 See id. at 497-98. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 498. 
73 See id. 
74 See Sax, supra note 38, at 498. 
75 See id. 
76 See Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969); Sax, supra 
note 38, at 50l. 
77 See Sax, supra note 38, at 496. 
78 See id. at 496-97. 
79 See id. at 498. 
80 See Robbins, 240 N.E.2d at 580. 
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legislature, and thereby exposed to public opinion.8! Although this 
rule developed from the courts' need to avoid conflict between agen-
cies, it has grown into an effective tool for private citizens acting to 
protect the public interest.82 
An example of the Massachusetts doctrine as applied to inter-
agency appropriation is found in Robbins v. Department of Public 
Works. 83 In that case, the plaintiffs attempted to enjoin the transfer 
of land from the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) to the 
Department of Public Works (DPW). The DPW planned to build an 
extension of 1-95 on the land in question.84 
The SJC in Robbins held that the land transfer was invalid.85 The 
court explained that public lands devoted to one public use cannot be 
diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and explicit 
legislation authorizing the diversion.86 The court determined that 
identification of the new use, as well as legislative awareness of the 
existing public use, was essential to such legislation.87 In short, "the 
legislation should express not merely the public will for the new use 
but its willingness to surrender or forgo the existing use."88 The court 
stated: 
We think it is essential to the expression of plain and explicit 
authority to divert parklands, Great Ponds, reservations and kin-
dred areas to a new and inconsistent public use that the Legisla-
ture identify the land and that there appear in the legislation not 
only a statement of the new use but a statement or recital show-
ing in some way legislative awareness of the existing public use.89 
Consequently, the SJC has dealt effectively with two difficult prob-
lems pertaining to public trust litigation.90 First, the Massachusetts 
approach precludes the courts from making public land policy.9! Sec-
ond, the Massachusetts design ensures that public land policy is made 
81 See Sax, supra note 38, at 502. 
82 [d. 
83 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 577. 
84 See id. at 579. 
85 [d. at 580. 
86 See id. at 579. 
87 See id. at 580. 
88 Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580. 
89 [d. 
90 See id.; Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966). 
91 See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Mass. 1981); Robbins, 244 
N.E.2d at 579; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 125. 
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in public view and by those politically accountable to the public's 
general wil1.92 
B. The Wisconsin Approach Toward the Public 'Prust Doctrine 
In contrast to Massachusetts' procedural approach, Wisconsin 
courts apply a substantive test in decisions concerning the modifica-
tion of public trust lands.93 The origins of the Wisconsin approach can 
be traced to the case of Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improve-
ment CO.94 
In 1891, the legislature passed a special act, conveying to John 
Reynolds title to the lands underlying Lake Muskego and Wind Lake, 
and authorizing him to drain these lakes.95 The purpose of the act was 
to preserve the public health and well-being of communities adjacent 
to the lakes.96 Reynolds transferred his interests to the defendant 
corporation, which he formed for the purpose of improving and selling 
the land, and proceeded to drain the lakes.97 In Priewe, the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin held that it was not bound by the legislature's 
declaration of purpose.98 In addition, the question of whether the act 
was designed to accomplish some public good or merely to advance a 
private gain was to be determined by the court.99 Furthermore, the 
court held that the legislature had no power, under the guise of 
legislating for the public health, to authorize the destruction of the 
lakes for the benefit of private parties.loo 
The Priewe case established two vital principles of the public trust 
doctrine in Wisconsin. lOl First, Wisconsin courts are not obligated to 
defer to declarations of public purposes that underlie legislation af-
fecting navigable waters.102 Second, if the purpose and effect of legis-
lation affecting navigable waters is solely for the benefit of a private 
interest, the legislation is void. loa 
92 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126; Sax, supra note 38, at 492, 501---D2. 
93 See State v. Public Servo Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73-74 (Wis. 1957); State V. Village of Lake 
Delton,286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
94 See Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1927). 
95 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 629. 
96 See id. at 629-30. 
97 See id. at 630. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 630. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
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In 1927, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided City of Milwau-
kee v. State. 104 In 1909, the legislature had passed an act ceding 1500 
feet of land underlying Lake Michigan to the city of Milwaukee for 
harbor purposes.105 In 1923, an amendment to the act authorized the 
city to fill, reclaim, and convey portions of the city's waterfront.106 The 
Illinois Steel Company subsequently received a portion of this con-
veyance.107 The company was authorized by an act of the legislature 
to fill in parts of the lake to aid commerce and navigation.108 The 
construction of dock and wharf facilities was also approved by the 
legislature.109 
In an action by Milwaukee to quiet title in and to the specified lands 
under Lake Michigan, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held for the 
city.110 The court's opinion noted that all public uses of Lake Michigan 
could continue in areas adjacent to the proposed projects.111 The court 
balanced the inconvenience to Lake users with the planned economic 
and commercial benefits to the city.112 Although Illinois Steel Com-
pany was a private entity, the Court distinguished this situation from 
Priewe, determining that the private benefits of the proposal were 
merely incidental to the procurement of public interests. 113 These 
public benefits included improved navigation and commerce facili-
ties,114 
City of Milwaukee held that no single public interest, though af-
forded the protection of the public trust doctrine, is absolute.u5 Some 
public uses must yield if other public uses are to exist at all.u6 These 
interests must be balanced and accommodated on a case-by-case ba-
sis.ll7 
Building on the City of Milwaukee holding, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, in State v. Public Service Commission, upheld an act that 
104 See City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927). 
105 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 631. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927). 
111 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 631. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. at 632; City of Milwaukee, 214 N.W. at 832. 
114 See City of Milwaukee, 214 N.W. at 830. 
115 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 632. 
116 See City of Milwaukee, 214 N.W. at 832. 
117 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 630-32. 
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granted authority to the city of Madison to fill approximately four 
acres (or one and one-fourth percent) of Lake Wingra for municipal 
purposes.U8 The state legislature made this decision despite govern-
ment findings that the project would reduce fish production from the 
lake by 1600 to 2000 pounds per year,u9 The court, articulating a 
five-part balancing test, explicitly held that the plan did not violate 
the public trust doctrine.12o First, public bodies would control the use 
of the area.121 Second, the area would be devoted to public purposes 
and open to the pUblic.122 Third, the diminution of lake area would be 
very small when compared with the whole of Lake Wingra.123 Fourth, 
no one of the public uses of the lake as a lake would be destroyed or 
greatly impaired.124 Fifth, the disappointment of those members of the 
public who may desire to boat, fish, or swim in the area to be filled 
was negligible when compared with the greater convenience to be 
afforded those members of the public who use the city park.125 
Therefore, under the Wisconsin Public Trust doctrine, courts may 
strike down legislative declarations of public purpose.126 If, however, 
a proposed development confers some type of public benefit, Wiscon-
sin courts would apply the five-part balancing test.127 Under the Wis-
consin test, public trust lands are particularly susceptible to publicly 
owned developments which incrementally encroach upon trust prop-
erty.128 For example, in City of Madison v. State, the city was allowed 
to build an auditorium and civic center on filled areas of Lake 
Monona.129 
IV. ApPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The United States Supreme Court has never extended explicitly 
the public trust doctrine to the federal government. In Illinois Cen-
118 See id. at 632. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 632. 
123 &e id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918, 921-22 (Wis. 1896). 
127 See State v. Public Servo Comm'n, 81 N.w'2d 71, 74 (Wis. 1957). 
128 See City of Madison V. State, 83 N.W.2d 674, 678-79 (Wis. 1957). 
129 I d. at 678. 
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tral Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Court held that the public trust 
doctrine prohibits state disposition of lands under navigable water-
ways.1SO Furthermore, the Court in dictum noted that title to land 
under navigable waterways is "different from the title the United 
States holds in the public lands which are open to pre-emption and 
sale."lSl This language has been interpreted to imply that the public 
trust doctrine, in its historical, English Common Law form, does not 
operate on federal inland public lands.l32 
An argument can be made, however, that federal public lands are 
protected by the public trust. Despite the lack of an explicit expansion 
of the public trust to federal lands, a dominant theme within the public 
trust doctrine, as articulated both by the United States Supreme 
Court and state courts, is the state's duty to exercise continued su-
pervision over the trust.1SS The states are burdened with the duty to 
protect their people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, 
and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases 
when such abdication is consistent with the purposes of the trust.1S4 
The federal government was created by the individual states, which 
delegated limited sovereign powers to the central government.1S5 As 
a result, the federal government cannot have powers superior to the 
bodies responsible for its creation.136 Therefore, like the states, the 
federal government presumably cannot abdicate its public trust re-
sponsibilities.ls7 
There is case law supporting application of the public trust to 
federallands.138 In United States v.l.58 Acres of Land, Massachusetts 
feared that a federal taking would preclude state control over trust 
lands.139 The United States had filed a Complaint in Condemnation to 
take waterfront property in Boston for use by the United States 
130 Charles F. Wilkinson, Public Trust in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 273 
(1980). 
131 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
132 Wilkinson, supra note 130, at 273. 
133 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453-54; National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court 
of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983). 
134 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 724. 
135 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 375 (1992). 
136 See id. 
1371d. 
138 See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 121 (D. Mass. 1981); lnre Steuart 
Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
139 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 121. 
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Coast Guard.140 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts answered the 
United States' complaint, and argued that the United States could not 
obtain fee simple absolute in land lying beneath the low water mark 
in Boston Harbor.141 The United States District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts held that the United States may obtain full fee 
simple title to land below the low water mark without destroying the 
public trust which is administered by both the federal and state 
sovereigns.l42 Therefore, although the federal government could take 
title to the land in fee simple, the public trust's duties and limitations 
applied equally to both the Commonwealth and the federal govern-
ment. l43 
Similar to 1.58 Acres, in the 1980 case of In Re Steuart Transpor-
tation, the Federal Government again was held accountable to the 
public trust doctrine.144 In that case, the Federal Government and the 
state of Virginia sued to recover for damages to waterfowl.l45 A barge 
carrying 19,700 barrels of oil sank in Chesapeake Bay and discharged 
a portion of its cargo.146 The court found that the public trust doctrine 
supported both the federal and state damage claims.147 
That the public trust doctrine extends to the federal government 
is an unsettled point oflaw.148 It is unlikely, however, that the doctrine 
exerts less responsibility on the federal government than the states.149 
V. ApPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO NATIONAL 
PARK SYSTEM UNITS 
Application of the public trust doctrine to National Park System 
Units is a similarly unsettled point of law.150 In Sierra Club v. Andrus, 
the Sierra Club's claim centered around federal water rights in Grand 
Canyon National Park, Glenn Canyon National Recreation Area, and 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 122. 
143 See id. at 123. 
144 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
145 See id. at 39. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. at 40. 
148 Compare 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 122, and In Re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. 
Supp. at 40, with Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980). 
149 See 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 123; In Re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. at 40. 
150 Compare Andrus, 487 F. Supp. at 449, with Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 
F. Supp. 284, 293 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modified, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also Light v. 
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888). 
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Bureau of Land Management lands.151 Fearful that federal reserved 
water rights were subject to a serious threat of harm by energy-re-
lated developments, the Sierra Club sued Secretary of the Interior 
Andrus.152 The plaintiff sought a judgment ordering defendants to 
define, assert, and protect federal reserved water rights in water 
courses in southern Utah and northern Arizona. l53 In addition, the 
Sierra Club requested a declaration by the court that federal reserved 
water rights do exist in the water courses at issue in that case. l54 
Asked to rule on statutory and trust violations by Secretary An-
drus, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
decided that the Secretary had no duties and obligations distinct from 
those statutorily defined.155 The court reasoned that the legislative 
history of the 1978 amendment to 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (entitled National 
Park System: administration; declaration of findings and purpose), 
made clear that any distinction between trust and statutory respon-
sibilities in the management of the National Park System is un-
founded. 156 In addition, Congress specifically choose 16 U.S.C. §1 to be 
the criteria by which National Park Service management should for-
mulate policy.157 The court in Andrus reasoned that, by asserting an 
explicit statutory standard as the basis of any judicial resolution of 
National Park Service management issues, Congress eliminated trust 
notions in National Park System management.158 Without question, 
statutes regulate a plethora of federal land aspects.159 Strong argu-
ments can be made, however, that the public trust doctrine is not 
completely preempted from these lands. 
That the federal government holds land in trust for its citizens is 
not a novel idea.160 For instance, in United States v. Beebe, the Su-
preme Court noted that the public domain is held by the federal 
government as part of its trust. 161 Moreover, the Court acknowledged, 
151 Andrus, 487 F. Supp. at 445, aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
152 See Andrus, 487 F. Supp. at 444. 
153 See id. at 445. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. at 449. 
156 See id. 
157 See Andrus, 487 F. Supp. at 449. 
158 See id. 
159 See Wilkinson, supra note 130, at 269. 
160 See United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888); see also Light v. United States, 220 
U.S. 523, 537 (1911). 
161 See Beebe, 127 U.S. at 342. 
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"the government is charged with the duty and clothed with the power 
to protect the public domain from trespass and unlawful appropria-
tion."162 
More recently, in Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, the 
United States District Court for the District of Northern California 
concluded that the public trust imposed duties upon the National Park 
Service in addition to those statutorily created.l63 In that case, plain-
tiff Sierra Club brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior 
for declaratory and mandatory relief. Sierra Club alleged that the 
Secretary failed to discharge statutory and fiduciary duties to protect 
Redwood National Park from damage caused by logging operations.l64 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia held that a general trust was imposed upon the National Park 
Service by the National Park System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, to conserve 
scenery and natural and historic objects and wildlife within the Na-
tional Parks, Monuments and Reservations.l65 Moreover, this duty 
obligated the National Park Service to provide for the enjoyment of 
the National Park units in such manner and by such means as will 
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.166 The 
Court's reasoning is further supported by the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act.167 The purpose of this act is to preserve areas of common 
cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy 
benefits for future generations.168 In addition, Professor Wilkinson 
reports that there is an imposing and growing body of case law 
suggesting that the public trust doctrine applies to the public lands.169 
162 Id.; see also Light, 220 U.S. at 536. 
163 See Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 293 (N.D. Cal. 1975); see 
also Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891) (deeming Secretary of Interior 
the guardian of the public lands). 
164 See Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. at 285. 
165 See id. at 287. 
168 See id. 
167 See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1994). 
168 See id. 
169 See Wilkinson, supra note 130, at 277 (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 
(1976), Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958), and others). 
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VI. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSAL: HOUSE BILL 260 
The National Park Service oversees 368 park units,170 which are 
visited by 260 million people annually.171 The proposed legislation, 
House Bill 260, would have affected 314 National Historic Cites, 
Monuments, Recreation Areas, Preserves, and Heritage Areas.172 The 
nation's fifty-four National Parks were exempted from the bill.173 
House Bill 260, the National Park System Reform Act of 1995, 
provided for a review of the National Park System.174 Accordingly, 
House Bill 260 would require the Secretary of the Interior to develop 
a "vision statement" for the National Park System within three 
years.175 This report would identify the goals and objectives of the 
National Park System together with criteria for determining which 
themes and resources are appropriate in the system.176 Also, lists of 
park areas to be added and removed from the National Park System 
would be included in the Secretary's review.177 
In addition, the bill would have created a National Park System 
Review Commission (NPSR Commission), charged with the task of 
proposing modifications to and the termination of specific park units.178 
The NPSR Commission would review the Secretary's report, or cre-
ate the report itself in the event that the Secretary failed to do SO.179 
This NPSR Commission, comprised of appointed, unelected officials 
would work with the Secretary of the Interior before forwarding its 
proposals to Congress, which could then vote on the recommendations 
individually.180 More likely, however, would be a scenario similar to the 
170 See generally The National Park System Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 260 Before the 
House Subcomm. on National Parks, Forests, and Lands, l04th Congo (1995) (statement of 
Robin W. Winks, Professor of History, Yale University). 
171 See 141 CONGo REC. H9095 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mink). 
172 See id. 
173 See H.R. 260, l04th Congo § 102(b)(B)(1995). 
174 See supra note 171, (statement of Rep. Mink). 
175 See Testimony of Congressman Joel Hefley, Feb. 23, 1995: Hearings Before the House 
Resources Subcomm. on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands, l04th Congo (1995) (state-
ment of Rep. Hefley). 
176 See H.R. 260, l04th Congo § 102(a)(1995). 
177 See H.R. 260 §§ 102(b), 201(b). 
178 See H.R. 260 § 103. 
179 See H.R. 260 § 103(a)(2). 
180 See 141 CONGo REC. H9092 (citing Parks in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,1995). 
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military base closings, by which Congress either enacts or rebuffs the 
NPSR Commission's proposals in an all or nothing omnibus act.181 
VII. ANALYSIS: THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
SHOULD BE ApPLIED IN THE PROCESS OF DECERTIFYING 
NATIONAL PARK AREAS 
The modern public trust doctrine, having expanded from its original 
purpose of promoting navigation and commerce, is now suited to 
provide a procedure for modifying National Park System U nits. l82 
According to Congress, the National Park System has grown to 
include superlative natural, historic, and recreation areas which ex-
press the United States' national heritage.1&,] Created for the common 
benefit of all Americans, these areas, individually and collectively, 
increase national dignity and recognition of their superb environ-
mental quality.l84 The National Park Service is charged with promot-
ing and regulating National Park Units for the purposes of conserva-
tion, recreation, and enjoyment.l85 Moreover, this task is to be carried 
out in such a manner as will leave areas· unimpaired for future gen-
erations.l86 
Therefore, Congress has recognized that units within the National 
Park System possess three characteristics: (1) heritage value, (2) 
unique beauty, and (3) a retention of greater value through non-ex-
clusive use.l87 These are the same attributes used to identify trust 
areas. ISS 
For example, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the 
California Supreme Court recognized California's duty to protect the 
peoples' common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and tide-
lands.189 In National Audubon Society, the trust was being used for 
a purpose identical to that propounded by the National Historic Pres-
181 See id. 
182 See National Park System: Administration, declaration of findings and purpose, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1a-1 (1991); Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969); Gould v. 
Greylock Preservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966). 
183 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I. 
184 See id. 
185 See Service created; director; other employees, 16 U.S.C. § 1. 
186 See id. 
187 See 16 U.S.C. § 1; 16 U.S.C. § la-I. 
188 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1 and 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 and 16 U.S.C. § 470, with Illinois Cent. R.R. 
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892) and National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine 
County, 658 P.2d, 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) and Marks v. Witney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
189 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 724. 
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ervation Act.190 That act declares that the spirit and direction of the 
nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic heritage.191 Be-
cause historically significant properties are being destroyed with in-
creasing frequency, National Historic Sites are established to pre-
serve cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and 
energy benefits to future generations. l92 
The protection of areas because of their unique beauty also has been 
a rationale used to invoke the public trust.193 In National Audubon 
Society, the court regarded Mono Lake as a scenic and ecological 
treasure of national significance.194 The belief that areas of particular 
beauty and historic value should be preserved resulted in the creation 
of the National Park System, which recognizes superlative natural, 
historic, and recreation areas.195 Similarly, statutes establishing indi-
vidual National Recreation Areas typically note outstanding scenic, 
recreational, and scientific features that justify the region's conserva-
tion and management.196 
The public trust also recognizes that certain areas achieve their 
greatest value when preserved for non-exclusive use.197 For instance, 
in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court struck 
down legislation that granted the railroad company exclusive rights 
to Chicago Harbor.198 If the grant at issue in Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. was allowed to stand, the railroad would be empowered to destroy 
or greatly impair public uses of Lake Michigan.199 More recently, in 
Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court explicitly recognized 
that the objective of the public trust has evolved in tandem with the 
changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways.2oo 
Consequently, the plaintiff was denied the right to use tidelands ex-
190 See id.; 16 U.S.C. § 470. 
191 See 16 U.S.C. § 470. 
192 See id. 
193 See National Aububon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 712; Marks, 491 P.2d at 374; City of Madison v. 
State, 83 N.w'2d 674 (Wis. 1957); Wisconsin v. Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.w'2d 622 (Wis. Ct. 
App.1979). 
194 See National Aububon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 712. 
190 16 U.S.C. § la-I. 
196 See 16 U.S.C. § 460cc (1991) (establishing of Gateway National Recreation Area); see also 
16 U.S.C. 460bb (1991) (establishing Golden Gate National Recreation Area); 16 U.S.C. § 460m-8 
(1991) (establishing Buffalo National River). 
197 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892); City of Madison, 83 N.w'2d 
at 678. 
198 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454. 
199 See id.; City of Madison, 83 N.w'2d at 678. 
200 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
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elusively for the purpose of development.201 The court noted that, 
"[t]here is a growing public recognition that one of the most important 
public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands 
trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that 
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study [and] as open 
space."202 The trust property was most valuable when preserved for 
non-exclusive use.203 This conclusion is similarly established in Na-
tional Park System statutes.204 Because the public trust doctrine ac-
counts for the very characteristics used in creating National Park 
System Units, trust procedures should be used to modify or decom-
mission of any such area.205 
Whether or not courts will apply the public trust doctrine to N a-
tional Park System Units, Congress should adopt the Massachusetts 
approach to public trust determinations before modifying park units. 
Two problems hinder House Bill 260's ability to reform the National 
Park System effectively and impartially. First, the NPSR Commis-
sion would be particularly susceptible to special interest pressures.206 
Second, compared to actions and decisions taken at the congressional 
level, determinations by the unelected NPSR Commission would be 
relatively hidden from public view.207 By utilizing the Massachusetts 
doctrine, Congress will create a more level playing field on which 
special interest lobbying and the public's concern for parkland can be 
debated.208 In addition, the Massachusetts approach will promote po-
litical accountability by mandating that members of Congress, rather 
than a commission, explicitly cite the public benefits that the legisla-
ture is willing to modify or abandon.209 
Compared with implementation of the Massachusetts public trust 
analysis, the procedures of House Bill 260 increase the risk that 
characteristics inherent in National Park System Units will be dis-
counted or overlooked.21o Initially, House Bill 260 would have directed 
201 See id. at 381. 
202 National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983). 
203 See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
2()j See 16 U.S.C. § 1; 16 U.S.C.A. § 1a-1. 
205 See 16 U.S.C. § 1; 16 U.S.C. § la-I; 16 U.S.C. § 470; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452; 
National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 724; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
206 Compare H.R. 260, l04th Congo § 103 (1995), with Sax, supra note 38, at 502. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See Robbins V. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969); Gould V. 
Greylock Preservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966). 
210 Compare Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126, with H.R. 260, l04th Congo (1995). 
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the Secretary of the Interior to adopt a plan to evaluate all units 
within the National Park System, except for the fifty-four National 
Parks.211 After identifying sub-standard units, the Secretary would 
determine if other management alternatives, outside the National 
Park System, would be more efficient.212 Operation by state and local 
governments, as well as the private sector, were included in the bill 
as possible options.213 Congress was to receive the Secretary's final 
report eighteen months after the criteria for evaluation had been 
selected.214 
House Bill 260 also would have created the National Park System 
Review Commission, to reviewed the Secretary's report, or, if the 
Secretary failed to develop and transmit a report, to develop the 
report itself.215 Consisting of members appointed by the House, Sen-
ate, and administration, the NPSR Commission would recommend a 
list of National Park System units where National Park Service man-
agement should be terminated or modified.216 Congress then would act 
on the NPSR Commission's findings either in part, in whole, or not at 
all.217 
The primary benefit of a commission-based approach is that recom-
mendations would be made. Congress, although empowered to exam-
ine the park system itself, is unwilling to grapple with this politically 
difficult task,218 In contrast, under House Bill 260, this analysis would 
be made by a relatively anonymous commission, whose members 
would not be beholden to voters.219 House Bill 260 would allow Con-
gress to abstain from politically difficult decisions and simply vote up 
and down on the NPSR Commission's recommendations.22o Any criti-
cism then could be deflected by insisting that the cumulative effect of 
the action taken was in the best interests of the entire country.221 
211 H.R. 260, l04th Congo § 101 (1995). 
212 See id. § 102(b). 
213 See id. 
214 See H.R. 260, 104th Congo § 102(d). 
215Id. § 103(a). 
216 See H.R. 260, 104th Congo (1995). 
217 See id. § 103(a)(3), (b). 
218 See 141 CONGo REC. H9093 (citation omitted). 
219 See id. 
220 See 141 CONGo REC. H9087 (statement by Rep. Hefley); 141 CONGo REC. H9092 (citation 
omitted); 141 Congo Rec. H9091 (citation omitted). 
221 See 141 CONGo REC. H9092 (citation omitted); 141 CONGo REC. H9086 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 
1995) (statement by Rep. Richardson). 
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House Bill 260, however, contains drawbacks. Rather than voting 
based on the particular characteristics of a particular area, the more 
likely scenario is that Congress will vote for or against the NPSR 
Commission's entire recommendation.222 Such an omnibus bill, remi-
niscent of military base closings, could threaten valuable wilderness 
along with mediocre sites where management should be modified or 
eliminated.223 And, most importantly, establishment of the NPSR 
Commission allows the government's elected officials to escape shoul-
dering responsibility for overseeing the National Parks System.224 
The NPSR Commission could recommend that parks be closed, sold, 
or modified.225 Regardless of what action is suggested, citizens have 
no recourse against members of the Commission, who would deter-
mine effectively which units are closed if the omnibus bill scenario 
materializes.226 And, compared to the average citizen, lobbyists advo-
cating for particular interests likely would exert the greatest amount 
of persuasive pressure upon a commission.227 
Through application of Massachusetts' Public Trust Doctrine, po-
litical accountability would be infused into congressional action to 
modify and/or decommission National Park System Units.228 The leg-
islative arm of government should be empowered to reform and 
strengthen the National Park System, which was established for the 
use and enjoyment of the public.229 Consequently, those modifying the 
system should be answerable to that public.230 
Under the Wisconsin approach to public trust lands, Congress could 
declare policy itself, or delegate such authority to a separate body.231 
Any policy, however, could not be solely for the benefit of a private 
party.232 
222 See 141 CONGo REC. H9092 (citation omitted); 141 CONGo REC. H9091 (citation omitted); 
141 CONGo REC. H9086 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1995) (statement by Rep. Richardson). 
223 See 141 CONGo REC. H9092 (citation omitted); 141 CONGo REC. H9086 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 
1995) (statement by Rep. Richardson). 
224 See 141 CONGo REC. H9092 (citation omitted); 141 CONGo REC. H9091 (citation omitted). 
225 H.R. 260, l04th Congo § 103(a)(3) (1995). 
226 See H.R. 260, l04th Congo § 103(b) (1995). 
227 See Sax, supra note 38 at 496-97; Gould V. Greylock Preservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 
126 (Mass. 1966). 
22B See Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969); Gould, 215 
N.E.2d at 126. 
229 See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (1991). 
230 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
231 See City of Madison V. State, 83 N.w'2d 258 (Wis. 1957). 
232 See City of Milwaukee V. State, 244 N.W. 820, 82~0 (Wis. 1927); Priewe V. Wisconsin State 
Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918, 922 (Wis. 1896). 
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Courts, applying the Wisconsin Trust Doctrine, would not be bound 
by congressional declarations of public purposes underlying trust 
legislation.233 Furthermore, the burden of proving that modifications 
of trust land are for the public's benefit is squarely upon the govern-
ment.234 
Finally, if the legislation conferred a public benefit, the court then 
would apply the five-part balancing test to the proposed alteration, 
examining whether: 1) public bodies will control the use of the area; 
2) the area will be devoted to public purposes; 3) the diminution of the 
area will be very small when compared with the whole; 4) a public use 
of the area will be destroyed or greatly impaired; and 5) the disap-
pointment of those members of the public who desire to use the area 
will be negligible when compared with the greater convenience to be 
afforded by the new use.235 
The benefits to be reaped from the Wisconsin scheme include the 
legislature's ability to delegate authority, which may be useful when 
poisonous political choices must be made.236 In addition, the Wisconsin 
courts encourage the legislature to manage the trust actively, allow-
ing novel uses in trust areas, so long as pre-existing uses are not 
inhibited significantly.237 Moreover, Wisconsin employs a substantive 
test, endeavoring to protect trust areas from short-sighted legislative 
initiatives.238 
The Wisconsin balancing test, however, leaves trust lands vulner-
able.239 When scrutinized individually, the five elements of the test are 
easily satisfied by projects that could greatly transform and/or de-
stroy trust lands.240 For example, so long as the trust area remains 
under state control and is used for some public interest, any develop-
ment will have passed the first two elements of the Wisconsin test.241 
Next, part of the test asks if diminution of the area will be small when 
compared with the whole.242 Consequently, any trust area could be 
destroyed incrementally, in small stages.243 Likewise, under the test's 
233 See Wisconsin v. Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
234 See id. at 636. 
235 See id. 
236 See State v. Public Servo Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Wis. 1957). 
237 See City of Milwaukee, 244 N.W. at 831. 
233 See Public Servo Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d at 73. 
239 See City of Milwaukee, 244 N.W. at 832; Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 632. 
240 See Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 632. 
241 See City of Madison, 83 N.W.2d at 678. 
242 See Public Servo Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d at 73-74; Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 632. 
243 See Village of Lake Delton, 86 N.W.2d at 631. 
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fourth and fifth elements, trust areas are susceptible to incremental 
encroachments that chip away at a particular public use or enjoy-
ment.244 
A more logical approach to the decertification of National Park 
units is embodied in Massachusetts public trust case law.245 Under this 
doctrine, Congress would possess nearly unfettered authority to dis-
pose of public lands.246 A reviewing court, however, would require that 
legislation transferring land from one use to another be explicit.247 The 
legislation would need to acknowledge the interest being surren-
dered, as well as the public use to which the land is to be put.248 
Consequently, the Massachusetts approach promotes political ac-
countability while simultaneously precluding courts from legislating 
public land policy.249 
The Massachusetts approach is vulnerable to legitimate criti-
cisms.260 For example, elected officials are forced to make deci-
sions concerning trust lands in full public view.251 Political momentum 
in favor of modifying or decertifying parkland will be difficult to 
maintain if Congress must explicitly cite the interests presently ac-
commodated by a park unit. To identify these interests and at the 
same time modify or decommission a park unit will no doubt require 
a measure of political fortitude. In addition, under the Massachusetts 
approach, public resources intended to be saved for future genera-
tions can be undermined by a simple majority vote of a current 
legislature.252 
CONCLUSION 
The factors which make National Park areas analogous to pub-
lic trust lands compel Congress to take a close look before decertify-
ing National Park Units. The Massachusetts approach to public 
trust questions provides an unparalled combination of flexibility in 
244 See id. at 632. 
246 See Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969); Gould v. 
Greylock Preservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966). 
246 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
247 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
248 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580. 
249 See id. 
250 See generally Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 114. 
261 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
262 See Robbins, 244 N.E.2d at 580; Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
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land management together with political accountability. Therefore, 
to modify or decommission National Park System Units, Con-
gress should adopt the Massachusetts approach rather than create 
the National Park System Review Commission envisioned in House 
Bill 260. 
